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Abstract 
People often reason about omissions. One line of research 
shows that people can distinguish between the semantics of 
omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions: for 
instance, not flunking out of college enabled you (but didn’t 
cause you) to graduate. Another line of work shows that people 
rely on the normative status of omissive events in inferring 
their causal role: if the outcome came about because the 
omission violated some norm, reasoners are more likely to 
select that omission as a cause. We designed a novel paradigm 
that tests how norms interact with the semantics of omissive 
enabling conditions. The paradigm concerns the circuitry of a 
mechanical device that plays music. Two experiments used the 
paradigm to stipulate norms and present a distinct set of 
possibilities to participants. Participants chose which causal 
verb best described the operations of the machine. The studies 
revealed that participants’ responses are best predicted by their 
tendency to consider the semantics of omissive relations. In 
contrast, norms had little to no effect in participants’ responses. 
We conclude by marshaling the evidence and considering what 
role norms may play in people’s understanding of omissions. 
Keywords: omissive causes; enabling; allowing; modal 
semantics; norms; mental models 
Introduction 
A railway gatekeeper’s job is to open and close a crossing 
gate that lets trains pass. In 1902, the gatekeeper for the 
Somerset and Dorset railway was found guilty of 
manslaughter because he failed to close the gate (R. v. 
Pittwood, 1902). While he was at lunch, a train passed 
through the open gate and crashed into a horse and cart, 
killing one man and injuring another. The case describes an 
omissive cause: the jury held that the gatekeeper’s failure to 
close the gate caused the death of an innocent bystander. 
Omissive causation is a controversial topic amongst 
philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars (Moore, 
2009; Bernstein, 2015; Henne, Pinillos, & De Brigard, 2017). 
People have little difficulty in distinguishing which event was 
causal from alternative events that are non-causal. But causes 
are often easy to establish when they occur in a particular 
place and at a particular time; for instance, throwing a switch 
at a particular time causes the particular gate to close, so it is 
easy to identify the intervening action as the cause. Since 
omissive causes—absences, failures to act, scarcities, etc.— 
do not occur in any spatial or temporal frame, they present 
unique difficulties for causal reasoning and theories of 
causation. 
One proposal suggests that norm violations affect causal 
judgments and play a fundamental role in establishing what 
constitutes a cause (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; McGrath, 
2005; Hart & Honoré, 1985). In the railway example, the 
gatekeeper was charged and found guilty because his 
occupation made it his responsibility to monitor the track. It 
may seem trivial that many other individuals—for instance, 
some passerby—also failed to close the gate, but previous 
philosophical treatments have difficulty explaining why only 
certain omissive causes are deemed relevant and not others 
(see McGrath, 2005; Bernstein, 2015). On the norm-based 
account, the passerby, unlike the gatekeeper, is not 
considered a cause, as there was no normative expectation for 
him to close the gate. The norm-based account provides an 
explanation for why people focus their attention on potential 
causes. Consistent with this view, recent studies show that 
reasoners view norm-violating omissions as causes but norm-
preserving events as non-causes or as enablers (Henne et al., 
2017; see also Clarke et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, some theorists question whether norms 
determine the meaning of omissive causal statements or 
whether norms simply bias causal judgments (Bernstein, 
2014; 2017, p. 89-90). Consider the following statement: 
 
1. The drought caused the famine. 
 
Some argue that omissive causal statements as in (1) do not 
involve norms in any way, yet they are easy to comprehend. 
If norms were a central part of the meanings of causal 
relations, then the absence of any norm should render (1) 
uninterpretable (Bernstein, 2017). On such a view, norms 
may be relevant in establishing causal relations—such as in 
the train example—but they are not central to their meaning. 
One clue for what it means to be a cause comes from the 
application of causal verbs: “causes,” “enables,” and 
“prevents.” Each verb refers to a relation between two events, 
and those relations have stark differences in their semantics. 
Psychological accounts of causal reasoning identify 
differences in the way people understand causal verbs (e.g., 
Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Sloman, Barbey, & 
Hotaling, 2009; Wolff, 2007). Accordingly, a viable theory 
of how people understand and infer omissive relations must 
distinguish the semantics between them. Consider the 
following two statements: 
 
2a. An absence of light causes a flower to die. 
  b. An absence of light enables a flower to die. 
 
(2a) seems sensible, but (2b) does not, because (2b) implies 
that the flower can live without light. Likewise, in the 
following two statements: 
 
3a. A lack of insecticides causes insects to thrive. 
  b. A lack of insecticides enables insects to thrive. 
 (3b) seems sensible, but (3a) does not, because (3a) 
inappropriately guarantees that insects will thrive once 
insecticides are eliminated. The distinctions may be 
compelling, but until recently, no theory of causal reasoning 
could explain them. 
A recent theory of omissive causation differentiates 
omissive causes from omissive enablers (Khemlani, 
Wasylyshyn, Briggs, & Bello, 2018). The theory is based on 
the idea that people represent causal scenarios by 
constructing and manipulating a set of discrete possibilities, 
i.e., mental models (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). The 
model-based theory—the “model theory,” for short—posits 
that omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions differ 
in the sets of possibilities to which they refer. On tasks that 
require reasoners to distinguish between the different 
relations, they should base their judgments on the semantics 
stipulated by the model theory (Khemlani et al., 2018). In 
contrast, if norms are central to the meaning of omissive 
relations, reasoners should base their decisions on norm-
violations (Henne et al., 2017). 
In what follows, we first delineate the predictions of the 
model theory and the norms hypotheses. We then describe an 
experimental paradigm that can test between the two 
predictions, and we present two novel experiments that test 
the competing predictions. The studies showed that reasoners 
separated omissive causes from omissive enabling conditions 
in a manner predicted by the model theory, and norm-
violations had little effect on their behavior. 
The model theory of causal reasoning 
The mental model theory of human reasoning proposes that 
humans reason based on representing sets of possibilities 
(Johnson-Laird, 2006). The meanings of spatial relations, 
temporal relations, and causal relations refer to the sets of 
possibilities consistent with each relation (Goodwin & 
Johnson-Laird, 2005; Khemlani, Barbey, & Johnson-Laird, 
2014). The model theory posits two systems of reasoning: a 
fast, intuitive system of reasoning constructs a single initial 
possibility—the “mental model”—to represent one or more 
assertions. Reasoners can formulate inferences rapidly by 
scanning that initial possibility, but those inferences are prone 
to error, because causal relations can be consistent with 
several possibilities. Errors can be corrected through 
deliberation, which is a process by which reasoners 
iteratively construct and consider alternative possibilities. 
Khemlani and colleagues recently extended the model 
theory to account for reasoning about omissive causation 
(Bello et al., 2017; Khemlani et al., 2018). Their account 
explains why people distinguish different omissive relations 
(Table 1). It appeals to the idea that people rapidly construct 
initial mental models, and then flesh out those initial models 
into “fully explicit” models. On this view, a mental model is 
a privileged, default possibility to which an omissive causal 
relation refers, whereas fully explicit models represent all the 
possibilities consistent with the modal semantics of the 
relation. The following diagram depicts the mental model of 
the omissive causal relation described in (2a): 
 ¬ light  death 
 
where ‘¬’ denotes the symbol for negation (Khemlani, 
Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012). Here, the lack of light is 
interpreted as a negated event, and it arranges the two events 
in the same chronological order in which they would occur. 
Hence, the model represents a single iconic possibility. When 
reasoners deliberate, they can consider all of the possibilities 
that accord with the modal semantics of omissive causation 
(Table 1). They can accordingly build fully explicit models 
of (2a), which are depicted in this diagram: 
 
 ¬ light  death 
light  death 
light ¬ death 
 
where each row represents a separate possibility. The bolded 
row represents the mental model. The latter two possibilities 
show that if the flower receives light, it may die anyway (for 
some other reason), or it may not die at all. But the theory 
predicts that reasoners should be less likely to think of these 
latter two possibilities at the outset because most reasoners 
only construct and reason with the mental model.  
The theory posits that the mental model of omissive 
enabling conditions is the same as the mental model of 
omissive causation. Hence, the model of (3b) above is: 
 
 ¬ insecticide  thrive  
 
It predicts that reasoners who draw conclusions on the basis 
of mental models should often conflate the two assertions 
(e.g., Wolff, 2007; Frosch & Johnson-Laird, 2011). When 
reasoners distinguish between omissive causes and enabling 
conditions, they should do so on the basis of their modal 
semantics, i.e., on the fully explicit models of the relations. 
The fully explicit models of an omissive enabling condition 
are depicted in the following diagram: 
 
 ¬ insecticide  thrive  
 ¬ insecticide ¬ thrive 
  insecticide ¬ thrive 
 
Unlike omissive causes, omissive enabling conditions are 
consistent with the possibility in which both the cause and the 
effect do not hold, i.e., the situation in which insecticides are 
administered and insects subsequently do not thrive. 
Omissive enabling relations typically prohibit the possibility 
in which the cause and the effect both hold (A and B), e.g., 
the insects thrive even when they are sprayed with 
insecticide. But in some situations, omissive enabling 
relations can take on a weaker meaning and permit that 
possibility, as in, “The failure to cut the grass enabled it to 
grow.” The statement permits the possibility in which the 
grass is cut and it grows anyway (Table 1).  
The model theory accordingly makes the following general 
hypothesis about semantics of omissive relations: 
 
Semantics hypothesis: On tasks that require reasoners to 
distinguish between alternative causal relations, they 
should discriminate between omissive causes and omissive 
enabling conditions on the basis of the possibilities unique 
to each relation. 
 
In contrast, reasoners are often susceptible to norm violations 
that affect their causal judgments (Henne et al., 2017). Hence, 
norm-based accounts posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Norms hypothesis: When norms are available, reasoners 
distinguish between causal relations by focusing on those 
candidate events that violate norms. Events that violate 
norms should be considered causes, whereas those that do 
not violate norms should be rejected as causes. 
 
In the next section, we describe a novel paradigm developed 
to test between the two hypotheses. 
A paradigm for testing semantics and norms 
Many existing paradigms test the meanings of omissive 
causes, but they do not typically encourage reasoners to 
consider and track multiple possibilities that are thought to be 
essential to the meanings (Henne et al., 2016; Khemlani et 
al., 2018; Wolff, Barbey, & Hausknecht, 2010; cf., Bello et 
al., 2017; Experiment 2). To try to overcome this limitation, 
we developed a novel paradigm that could be used to 
investigate how people distinguish the meanings of causal 
relations. 
The paradigm made use of diagrams akin to those shown 
in Table 2. The basic diagram depicts a machine with a 
speaker, a red battery, a safety switch (which appeared green 
or else black), a blue wire, and an unnamed yellow 
component. The diagram could vary in several ways in order 
to depict different possibilities. For instance, the speaker 
could be playing or not playing (depicted as a series of 
soundwaves or not); the blue wire could be connected to the 
red battery, or else not connected; and the safety is green 
when it is on and black when it is off. The safety switch 
allowed for the establishment of a norm: participants were 
taught that whenever the safety is on (colored green), the blue 
wire is not supposed to touch the battery. And when the safety 
is off (colored black), the blue wire is supposed to touch the 
battery. Hence, the machine could be depicted in 2 (sound or 
no sound) x 2 (wire connected or disconnected) x 2 (safety on 
or off) = 8 different configurations. Depending on the 
particular condition in the experiments, those various 
configurations either violated or preserved norms. And those 
various configurations were either compatible with a 
particular omissive causal relation or incompatible with it. 
The paradigm allows to directly compare predictions made 
by both the semantics hypothesis and the norms hypothesis. 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided participants a single trial in 
which they received three different diagrams (Table 2). After 
studying three different diagrams, participants were given a 
sentence completion task that tested their understanding of 
the scenario depicted. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 presented participants with three separate 
diagrams. Participants only received diagrams that were 
either possible or impossible given causal and enabling 
relations: diagrams depicting context-dependent 
contingencies were not used in the experiment (Tables 1 and 
2). Half the participants saw a set of diagrams in which each 
diagram was compatible with the following omissive 
enabling relation: 
 
4.  The blue wire not touching the red battery allows the 
speaker to play music. 
 
The other half saw a set of diagrams that were compatible 
with (4) and the following causal assertion (5): 
 
5.  The blue wire not touching the red battery causes the 
speaker to play music. 
 
Because the experiment avoided context-dependent 
contingencies, the remaining diagrams compatible with (5) 
were also compatible with (4), so the set of diagrams were 
ambiguous: the model theory predicts that participants should 
treat them as depicting both omissive causes and omissive 
enabling conditions (Khemlani et al., 2018, Experiment 4). 
Participants were given a sentence completion task in 
which they chose the causal verb (“causes” or “allows”) to 
complete the following sentence: 
 
 The blue wire not touching the battery _______ the 
speaker to play music. 
 
Notably, for the purposes of the study, the verb “allows” was 
treated as equivalent to “enables”. The experiment 
accordingly tested the prediction of the semantics hypothesis 
that reasoners should select the causal verb that matched the 
possibilities depicted. Hence, the semantics hypothesis 
predicts that reasoners should select “allows” more often for 
the enabling condition than the ambiguous condition. 
Experiment 1 also tested the norms hypothesis. Half the 
conditions in the study concerned abnormal situations in 
which the safety was off, and the other half concerned normal 
situations in which the safety was on, and participants were 
instructed that the blue wire is not supposed to touch the 
battery when the safety was on, and that it was supposed to 
touch the battery when the safety was off. The norms 
hypothesis predicts that people should be sensitive to norm 
violations, i.e., they should be more likely to select the verb 
“causes” to fill in the sentence provided for abnormal 
omissions compared to normal ones. In turn, normal 
omissions should be judged to be involved in enabling 
relations. The semantic hypothesis, however, posits that 
participants’ responses should not vary as a function of 
whether the condition was abnormal or normal—only as a 
function of which set of possibilities participants considered. 
 
Table 1: The table outlines the semantics of omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions. The rows separate omissive causes and 
omissive enabling conditions. The cells in each column describe whether each contingency is possible given a particular omissive relation. 
The mental models are always possible. The bolded column denotes the contingency diagnostic of omissive enabling conditions. 
 
 
Methods 
Participants A total of 822 adults participated in this study 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Of these participants, 
59 did not complete the study, and 26 were excluded for 
failing to pass two attention checks. Data were analyzed with 
the remaining 796 participants (Mage = 34, SD = 11.0, age 
range = [18-71], 43% females).  
 
Design and procedure Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of four possible conditions in a 2 (enabling vs. 
ambiguous) x 2 (normal vs. abnormal) between-participants 
design. Participants were acquainted with the machine in 
Figure 1 and its various components. After viewing and 
responding to instructions, participants were presented with 
three diagrams of configurations of the machine. The 
diagrams appeared on the screen simultaneously.  To check 
their comprehension of the machine and the three separate 
possibilities, they matched the possibilities with descriptions 
provided in a dropdown menu, i.e., they chose from the 
following options to describe each of the three diagrams: (1) 
“The blue wire touches the battery, and the speaker plays 
music,” (2) “The blue wire touches the battery, and the 
speaker does not play music,” (3) “The blue wire does not 
touch the battery, and the speaker plays music,” and (4) “The 
blue wire does not touch the battery, and the speaker does not 
play music.” The order in which the possibilities were 
presented was fixed. In the normal condition, the machine’s 
safety was green, so the blue wire was not supposed to touch 
the battery. The blue wire not touching the battery is normal. 
In the abnormal condition, the machine’s safety was black, so 
the blue wire is supposed to touch the battery. The blue wire 
not touching the battery is abnormal. Participants were 
explicitly instructed to attend to the color of the safety and 
what the blue wire was supposed to do. They were then asked 
to think back to their observations and then fill in the verb in 
the sentence: “The blue wire not touching the battery ______ 
the speaker to play music.” Participants could choose 
between the verb “causes” or “allows” from a drop-down 
menu, and they could not proceed until a choice was made. 
 
Post-experimental questionnaire Participants filled out a 
post-experimental questionnaire that asked them if they had 
paid attention and if they had taken the survey multiple times. 
Participants who reported affirmatively on either question 
were excluded. 
Results and discussion 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of participants who chose 
“allows” as a function of whether the condition was normal 
or not and as a function of whether the diagrams were 
consistent with the semantics for omissive enabling 
conditions or else ambiguous. Participants chose “allows” 
more often for diagrams consistent with enabling conditions 
than for ambiguous diagrams (74% vs. 54%; Mann-Whitney 
test, z = 5.65, p < .0001, Cliff’s 𝛿  = .19). Participants selected 
“allows” more often when the diagrams were presented in a 
normal rather than an abnormal context—although this result 
was not statistically significant (68% vs. 62%; Mann-
Whitney test, z = 1.72, p = .09, Cliff’s 𝛿  = .06). A follow-up 
generalized logistical mixed-model (GLMM) regression 
further revealed that the difference in selection between the 
two conditions was inconsistent with a significant effect (β = 
.00, p = .97), as was the interaction between the two 
conditions (β = .48, p = .12). Nevertheless, a planned 
comparison revealed that for ambiguous diagrams, 
participants selected “allows” more often when the diagrams 
were presented in a normal context rather than an abnormal 
context (61% vs. 49%, Mann-Whitney test, z = 2.35, p = .02,  
 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of participants who chose “allows” instead of 
“causes” in Experiment 1 as a function of whether participants saw 
normal or abnormal devices, and as a function of whether the 
diagrams were consistent with omissive enabling conditions only or 
consistent with both omissive causes and omissive enabling 
conditions. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 2: The three diagrams presented to participants in enabling and the ambiguous conditions. These diagrams all depict the normal 
conditions, i.e., the safety is on, so the blue wire is not supposed to touch the red battery. In Experiment 1, participants were not provided 
with written cues about the condition of the safety switch. In Experiment 2, those cues were provided (as in the diagrams above).  
 
Cliff’s 𝛿 = .12). All data and analysis code available at 
https://osf.io/jf36w/. The result provides some support for 
the norm hypothesis, which predicts that people should be 
more likely to select “causes” (and less likely to select 
“allows”) for abnormal contexts. It also suggests that 
participants were sensitive to the norm manipulation: they 
comprehended the norms and took them into account in 
making their selections. If they had not, they would have 
shown no sensitivity to whether the diagrams were in 
normal or abnormal context. Yet, an analogous comparison 
for diagrams consistent with omissive enabling conditions 
was not reliable, and so the study revealed mixed support 
for the norms hypothesis. 
Experiment 1 corroborated the prediction that reasoners 
interpret omissive causes and enabling conditions in 
accordance with the semantics outlined by the model theory. 
Reasoners in the enabling condition selected “allows” more 
often than those in the ambiguous condition. Moreover, 
participants’ responses did not depend on whether a norm had 
been violated or not. If, as the norms hypothesis states, 
abnormal situations help reasoners choose which candidate 
events constitute causes, then those abnormalities appeared 
to have no effect on participants’ tendencies to select 
appropriate causal relations. 
One limitation of Experiment 1 is that reasoners may have 
simply failed to recognize abnormalities in the first place, i.e., 
they may not have encoded the black safety switch’s color, 
which was designed to serve as a cue that a norm had been 
violated. Another limitation of the study is that participants 
evaluated only one set of three diagrams and only one causal 
relation. Experiment 2 corrected for both of these limitations. 
Experiment 2 
Because participants may not have picked up on the norm 
distinction between conditions in Experiment 1, we sought to 
ensure that the difference was salient in Experiment 2. Hence, 
rather than just identifying the color as the difference in 
norms, Experiment 2 added the verbal cues “SAFETY ON” and 
“SAFETY OFF” to the diagrams (see Table 2). Moreover, the 
study employed a within-participants design to further 
validate the findings from Experiment 1 supporting the 
semantics hypothesis. Hence, each participant saw four 
distinct sets of three diagrams. 
Methods 
Participants A total of 215 adults participated in this study 
on AMT. Of these, 21 participants were excluded for failing 
to pass two attention checks. Data were analyzed with the 
remaining 194 participants (Mage = 33.82, SD = 9.39, age 
range [18-68] 40% females). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The stimuli used in Experiment 2. Participants in the 
abnormal condition saw the machine with the black safety i.e., in the 
off position (top diagram), and those in the normal condition saw 
the machine with the green safety, i.e., in the on position (bottom 
diagram). 
Design and procedure Participants acted as their own 
controls and received all four possible conditions in a 2 
(enabling vs. ambiguous) x 2 (normal vs. abnormal) within-
participants design. As in Experiment 1, participants were 
acquainted with the machine and its various components. The 
model conditions were constructed just as they were in 
Experiment 1 (see Table 2). The stimuli were modified such 
that the normal and abnormal conditions were more salient 
by adding the words “SAFETY ON” and “SAFETY OFF” to the 
diagrams (Figure 2). 
Results and discussion 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of participants who chose 
“allows” as a function of whether the condition was normal 
or not and as a function of whether the diagrams were 
consistent with the semantics for omissive enabling 
conditions or else ambiguous. As in Experiment 1, 
participants selected “allows” more often when the diagrams 
depicted possibilities uniquely consistent with omissive 
allowing relations rather than ambiguous possibilities (77% 
vs. 53%; Mann-Whitney test, z = 7.00, p < .0001, Cliff’s 𝛿  = 
.24). They didn’t reliably select “allows” more often for 
diagrams in an abnormal vs. a normal context (66% vs. 64%; 
Mann-Whitney test, z = .83, p = .41, Cliff’s 𝛿  = .03). GLMM 
regression analyses likewise corroborated the nonparametric 
analyses: it yielded an effect of whether the diagrams were 
ambiguous or consistent with omissive allowing conditions 
(B = 1.14, p < .0001), but no effect of normality (B = .15, p = 
.54) and no interaction (B = .02, p = .95). 
A planned comparison revealed that for ambiguous 
diagrams, participants did not reliably select “allows” more 
often for abnormal than normal contexts (55% vs. 52%; 
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of participants who chose “allows” instead of 
“causes” in Experiment 2 as a function of whether participants saw 
normal or abnormal devices, and as a function of whether the 
diagrams were consistent with omissive enabling conditions only or 
ambiguous. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Mann-Whitney test, z = .61, p = .54, Cliff’s 𝛿  = .03). Hence, 
overall, the results are not consistent with the norms 
hypothesis, which states that reasoners should be more likely 
to select “causes” (and less likely to select “allows”) for 
abnormal vs. normal contexts. 
Just as in Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 support 
the prediction of the model theory with respect to its 
predictions about the semantics of omissive enabling 
conditions. Reasoners in the enabling condition selected 
“allows” more often those in the ambiguous condition. 
Moreover, participants’ responses did not depend on whether 
a norm had been violated or not. 
General Discussion 
Two experiments were designed to test how participants 
judge the causal effect omissive events have on outcomes. 
The experiments corroborated a recent theory of omissive 
causation, which predicts that reasoners should be able to 
distinguish omissive enabling conditions from other sorts of 
omissive relation (Khemlani et al., 2018). Moreover, the 
results showed that norm violations cannot explain the 
semantic difference between causes and enabling conditions. 
The results of these studies can help refine the role that 
norms play in causal reasoning. As Henne and colleagues 
(2017) show, norms help select potential causes and 
distinguish them from irrelevant non-causes. The present 
studies, however, show that norms do not always explain the 
difference between causes and enablers. When reasoners 
consider the distinctive possibilities consistent with enabling 
conditions norms have little to no effect on causal judgment. 
When reasoners consider only the mental model, norms may 
have a more prominent effect on causal judgment. A more 
robust extension of the model theory, i.e., one that explains 
how norms are represented and how they modulate 
possibilities could potentially explain both the semantics 
between different causal verbs as well as how reasoners 
isolate potential causes from non-causes. Such a theory 
would also have to be contrasted with recent models of causal 
strength that could potentially explain the norm effects and 
the results predicted by the model theory (Icard, Kominsky, 
& Knobe, 2018). 
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